Gary E. Crosland v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah: Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
Gary E. Crosland v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah: Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Virginius Dabney; Dabney and Dabney; Attorneys for Respondent.
James R. Black; Attorney for Workers\' Compensation Fund of Utah Amicus Curiae; Callister,
Duncan and Nebeker; J. Angus Edwards; Purser, Okazaki and Berrett; Benjamin A. Simms;
Attorneys for Petitioners; Robert W. Brandt; Michael A. Peterson; Richards, Brandt, Miller, and
Nelson; Attorneys for Utah Self-Insurers' Association, Amicus Curiae.
This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Crosland v. Industrial Commission, No. 920247.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4214




SUPREME QftOHCT Mn<7^0Z4"7 
BRIEF 
GARY E. CROSLAND, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY; and SMITH 
ADMINISTRATORS, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
Court of Appeals No. 910291CA 
Pr ior i ty No. 16 
fyow 7 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Virginius Dabney 
DABNEY & DABNEY 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Petition for review of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
J. Angus Edwards 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Benjamin A. Sims 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
James R. Black 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
Amicus Curiae 
Robert W. Brandt 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Attorneys for Utah Self-
Insurers7 Association, Amicus 
Curiae 
F I L E D 
MAY 2 0 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GARY E. CROSLAND, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF : 
UTAH; YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY; and SMITH : 
ADMINISTRATORS, j 
Defendants/Petitioners. : 
: Court of Appeals No. 
: Priority No. 16 
910291CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petition for review of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
J. Angus Edwards 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104 
Benjamin A. Sims 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
James R. Black 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
Amicus Curiae 
Robert W, Brandt 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Attorneys for Utah Self-
Insurers' Association, Amicus 
Curiae 
Virginius Dabney 
DABNEY & DABNEY 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities ii 
Questions Presented for Review 1 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 2 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 2 
Controlling Statutes and Regulations 2 
Statement of the Case 3 
Statement of Facts 4 
Argument I 6 
A Writ of Certiorari Should Be Granted 
Under Rule 46(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, For The Reason That The 
Interpretation of § 35-1-66 By The Utah 
Court of Appeals Contravenes The Explicit 
Language In The Statute And The Guide To 
The Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
Argument II 11 
A Writ of Certiorari Should Be Granted Under 
Rule 46(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
On The Grounds that There Is A Conflict With 
Decisions By The Utah Supreme Court 
Argument III 13 
A Writ of Certiorari Should Be Granted 
Pursuant to Rule 46(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Since There Is A 
Conflict Between Panels of The Utah 
Court of Appeals 
Argument IV 16 
A Writ of Certiorari Should Be Granted 
Under Rule 46(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, On The Grounds 
That It Is An Important State Law 
Question of First Impression 
5021594.jae i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Conclusion 18 
Appendix 
5021594. jae i l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Allen v. Industrial Commission 12,14,17 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) 
Crosland v. Board of Review of 1,2,6,11,13 
Industrial Commission 15,16,17,18 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 5 (Utah App. 1992) 
Holloway v. Industrial Commission 1,11,12,13, 
729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986) 18 
Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega 17 
562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) 
Large v. Industrial Commission 17 
758 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1988) 
Morton v. Tax Commission 1,11,12 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission 2,6,13,14 
800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990) 
STATUTES CITED 
§ 35-1-44(4) 2,8,9 
§ 35-1-44(6) 2,8,9 
§ 35-1-66 1,2,6,7,8, 
10,15,16,17, 
18,19 
$ 78-2-2(3) 2 
§ 78-2-2(5) 2 
§ 35-1-69 2-15-17 
§ 35-1-98 8 
AUTHORITY CITED 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 3,6,7,9, 
Impairment 13,18 
5021594.jae iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari hereby incorporates the 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Utah Self-Insurers' 
Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, This 
Petition refers to the amicus briefs where necessary, but will not 
repeat the arguments made in the briefs of the Utah Self-Insurers 
Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on the grounds that Crosland v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) , 
radically departed from: (a) the explicit language in the statute 
and (2) the accepted and usual finding of fact by the Medical Panel 
that applicant's permanent impairment from developmental 
abnormalities to the spine contributed to his industrial injury and 
constituted "any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident...11 within the meaning of § 35-1-66, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
2. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46(b) on the grounds that Crosland v. 
Industrial Commission contravenes the standard of review 
established in Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 
and the analysis of asymptomatic conditions in Hollowav v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986). 
3. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari under Rule 46(a) on the grounds that the there is a 
direct conflict between the decisions Crosland v. Industrial 
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Commission, 18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3 5, and Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990). 
4. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of 
Certiorari under Rule 46(d) on the grounds that Crosland v. 
Industrial Commission profoundly disrupts the de€>p-seated public 
policy objective of encouraging Utah employers to hire workers with 
disabilities and impairments by establishing a fair basis for 
apportioning workers' compensation disability awards. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioners seek review by Petition for Writ of Certiorari of 
the Utah Court of Appeals decision Crosland v. Industrial 
Commission, 18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. (See Appendix "A.") 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was filed on March 
20, 1992. Jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari sought by petitioners is conferred upon the Utah Supreme 
Court by Article VIII, § 3, Utah Constitution; §§ 78-2-2(3) and 
(5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended); and, Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provisions of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) are controlling and attached in Appendix "B": 
§ 35-1-44(4) § 35-1-66 
§ 35-1-44(6) § 35-1-69 
The controlling rule is Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The controlling medical definition of "permanent 
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impairment" from the American Medical Association Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment is attached in Appendix "C." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This claim was filed by applicant for an industrial accident 
while employed at Young Electric Sign Company. Applicant injured 
his low back and all physicians agreed that claimant had a 
preexisting, asymptomatic condition that was aggravated by the 
industrial injury. Applicant filed a claim before the Industrial 
Commission of Utah against his employer. 
On February 28, 1990, an evidentiary hearing on applicant's 
claim was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. (R.36.) On March 30, 1990, the 
Industrial Commission mailed its Summary of Medical Record and 
Testimony to the parties. (R.56-61.) No objections were filed by 
any party to the Summary. On April 27, 1990, the ALJ appointed 
Drs. Madison Thomas and Wallace Hess as medical panel members to 
make an impartial evaluation of applicant's claim. (R.56-57.) On 
June 21, 1990, the Industrial Commission mailed copies of the 
Report of Medical Panel dated May 8, 1990 to all parties. (R.65.) 
On August 24, 1990, the ALJ issued the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order which adopted the Report of Medical 
Panel and ordered defendants to pay temporary total and permanent 
partial compensation in excess of $12,000, interest, and all 
medical expenses. (R. 77-77.) 
On September 11, 1990, applicant filed a Motion for Review and 
objected to the failure of the ALJ to award an additional ten 
percent permanent partial compensation for the aggravation of 
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claimant's preexisting, asymptomatic developmental abnormalities. 
(R. 79-82.) Defendants responded to the Motion. (R. 86-90). On 
April 25, 1991, the Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for 
Review and affirmed the ALJ's Order. (R. 114-117). 
On May 24, 1991, applicant filed a Petition For Review with 
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 120.) On March 20, 1992, the Utah 
Court of Appeals filed its opinion. (See Appendix "A.") 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Report of Medical Panel found that applicant was stable 
and had a twenty percent whole person permanent impairment rating 
with one-half, ten percent, specifically attributed to preexisting, 
developmental abnormalities in the spine. (R. 183-184.) The 
Medical Panel explained it was "unlikely that he [applicant] would 
have had the degree of difficulty had he not had the developmental 
abnormality." (R. 182.) The Panel explicitly found that the 
developmental abnormality and the industrial accident were "both 
. . . contributory . . . ." (R. 182-183.) 
The Medical Panel described the claimants injuries as 
follows: 
% 
Whole 09 Feb Preexisting 
Man 1989 Condition(s) 
Low back: 20% 1/2 1/2 
Spondylolisthesis 
unoperated with limited 
range of motion 
. . . . 
The industrial injury did medically aggravate a pre-
existing condition of the applicant. Comment: As 
indicated previously, this was an asymptomatic condition, 
but an abnormal status with a present to a sufficient 
degree to be contributory to his present impaired status. 
(R. 184-85.) 
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On February 9, 1989, the claimant and another employee were 
moving a sign that weighed approximately 200 pounds and he twisted 
his upper torso to move around a corner and injured his low back. 
(R. 73.) Applicant finished his work shift that day, but the next 
day he was directed by his employer to obtain medical treatment. 
(R. 73.) The claimant's CT scan showed that there was 
spondylolysis at L-5 and preexisting lumbar disc disease at L3-4 
and L5-S1 that were clearly not caused by the injury on the 
preceding day. (R. 74.) Applicant's treating physician gave the 
claimant a twenty percent whole person impairment rating on 
September 28, 1989. (R. 74.) In January 1990, the applicant was 
rated as having a work capacity to perform medium/light work. (R. 
74.) 
In the Findings of Fact, applicant was reported to never had 
any prior back problems and the ALT concluded as follows: 
The panel found that the applicant was 
medically stable as of the date of examination 
(May 8, 1990) and that the applicant had a 20% 
whole person impairment related to the 
industrial injury, with 1/2 or 10% of that 
rating attributable to the applicant's 
asymptomatic pre-existing spondylolisthesis 
and 10% attributable to the industrial injury. 
(R. 74-75.) 
In the Motion for Review, claimant objected to the award of 
permanent partial disability compensation on the grounds that he 
was entitled to an additional ten percent in permanent partial 
compensation for the preexisting, asymptomatic developmental 
abnormalities. (R. 79-82.) In the Order Denying Motion for Review, 
the Industrial Commission found no evidence that applicant's low 
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back was symptomatic. (R. 114-115.) However, the Commission ruled 
that the claimant's preexisting spondylolisthesis (breaking down or 
dissolution of the body of the vertebrae) and spondylolisthesis 
(forward movement of the body of one vertebrae on the lower 
vertebrae below it) caused one-half of applicant's twenty percent 
whole person impairment rating. (R. 114-115.) The Commission held 
that the findings of the ALJ had ample support in the evidence. 
The Commission noted that in the opinion of the ALJ and the Medical 
Panel the job injury and preexisting conditions were 
"contributory." (R. 115.) The Commission found that the allocation 
between the preexisting condition and the industrial injury of ten 
percent was reasonable. (R. 115.) The Commission held that an 
identical allocation had been approved in Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990). (R. 115.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the rulings by the ALJ and 
Commission and awarded applicant compensation for the ten percent 
impairment that preexisted the industrial accident. 
ARGUMENT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(c), 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FOR THE REASON THAT 
THE INTERPRETATION OF § 35-1-66 BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONTRAVENES THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE AND THE 
GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 
Rule 46(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that 
a Writ of Certiorari will be granted when a decision by the Utah 
Court of Appeals "has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision." The Crosland v. Board of 
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Review, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, opinion is a sweeping change in 
the accepted and usual course of claims before the Commission. 
The Utah Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the terms 
"any physical impairment" in § 35-1-66 to mean "functional 
^permanent impairment'" in reliance on the language in the statute, 
legislative history, and decisions in other states. Id. at 37. The 
court failed to cite or rely on the usual, accepted, and precise 
definition of "impairment" in the Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment 2-3 (A. Engelberg 3rd ed. 1988). Section 35-
1-66 does not expressly or impliedly restrict impairment to 
functional impairment. The legislative history cited by the court 
only describes compensation "based on physical impairment caused by 
an industrial accident[,]" without any mention or reference to 
functional impairment. Id. at 37 (quoting Laws of Utah ch. 116 
H.B. no. 218 preamble.) The court was persuaded by authority from 
states where the terms "impairment" and "disability" were confused. 
Id. (citations omitted). By contrast, the term "impairment" in § 
35-1-66 is not limited or clarified by language that connotes 
disability or functional diminishment. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ and Commission and 
found that applicant was entitled to twenty percent permanent 
partial compensation under § 35-1-66. The court, however, did not 
disagree with any of the findings of the Medical Panel. Thus, the 
court affirmed that ten percent of applicant's permanent impairment 
existed prior to the industrial accident, that ten percent of the 
impairment was caused by the accident, and that the asymptomatic 
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developmental abnormalities were contributory to the industrial 
injury. 
The first sentence and the second to the last paragraph of § 
35-1-66 are dispositive of this appeal. The first sentence of § 
35-1-66 provides that ff[a]n employee who sustained a permanent 
impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who files an 
application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may receive a 
permanent partial disability award from the commission." The 
requirement that a claimant may receive permanent partial 
disability benefits only for permanent impairment caused by an 
industrial accident is made explicit in the second to the last 
paragraph of § 35-1-66 which provides that "[p]ermanent partial 
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent 
impairment that existed prior to an industrial accident." 
The language of § 35-1-66 cannot be clearer that permanent 
partial disability compensation cannot be paid for permanent 
impairment that preexists the industrial injury. The terms "any 
permanent impairment" were not defined in the Workers' Compensation 
Act until recent amendments defined "impairment" and "disability" 
in §§ 35-1-44(4) and (6), Utah Code Annotated (1991). Impairment 
is defined as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical 
or functional abnormality or loss." § 35-1-44(6). "'Disability' 
means becoming medically impaired as to function." § 35-1-44(4). 
These amendments were not in effect at the time of applicant's 
injury, but the definitions in §§ 35-1-44 merely codified the well-
settled meanings of the terms "impairment" and "disability." 
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As with many terms used in the Workers' Compensation Act, the 
terms "any permanent impairment" are exclusively medical matters 
for physicians. The parties, counsel, the ALJ, and the Industrial 
Commission, cannot offer opinions on the existence or amount of 
permanent "impairment" an injured worker may have. In the present 
case, the applicant's permanent impairment was determined by the 
treating and examining physicians, including the Medical Panel, 
based solely on the standards in the American Medical Association 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A. Engelberg 3rd 
ed. 1988). This treatise is devoted entirely to the evaluation of 
"permanent impairment" and is the authoritative publication that 
physicians rely on to perform impairment ratings. 
The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment defines 
"impairment" and "disability" as follows: 
The accurate and proper use of medical information to 
assess impairment in connection with disability determinations 
depends on the recognition that, whereas impairment is a 
medical matter, disability arises out of the interaction 
between impairment and external demands. Consequently, as 
used in the Guidesf "impairment" means an alteration of an 
individual's health status that is assessed by medical means, 
"disability," which is assessed by nonmedical means, means an 
alteration of an individual's capacity to meet personal, 
social, or occupational demands, or to meet statutory or 
regulatory requirements. Simply stated, "impairment" is what 
is wrong with the health of an individual; "disability" is the 
gap between what the individual cr.n do and what the individual 
needs or wants to do. 
Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original). 
The Guides and §§ 35-1-44(4) and (6) have substantially 
similar definitions of "impairment" and "disability." The Medical 
Panel assessed applicant's impairment by medical means strictly in 
accordance with these medical definitions. The ALJ and Commission 
5021594.jae 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were obligated to follow these medical assessments and adopted them 
when the Report of Medical Panel was incorporated into the rulings. 
The opinions by the physicians on the extent of permanent 
impairment are necessarily medical matters. The independent, 
impartial Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah concluded that there was a ten percent permanent partial 
impairment that existed prior to the industrial accident and a ten 
percent permanent partial impairment that was caused by the 
accident. Applicant did not object to the Report of Medical Panel 
or offer evidence in opposition to the Report of Medical Panel on 
the ten percent preexisting permanent partial impairment. Thus, it 
is undisputed that applicant received ten percent impairment as a 
result of the industrial accident and a ten percent permanent 
impairment that was not a result of the industrial accident within 
the meaning of the first sentence of § 35-1-66. 
The only dispute is whether the applicant is entitled to be 
paid for the ten percent permanent impairment that existed prior to 
the industrial accident pursuant to the second to the last 
paragraph of § 35-1-66 as the statute was amended in 1988. The 
parties do not disagree with the findings of the Medical Panel that 
the claimant's preexisting developmental abnormalities in his spine 
were asymptomatic until aggravated by the industrial accident. The 
absence of symptoms, however, does not mean that claimant did not 
have a permanent impairment prior to the industrial accident, it 
merely means that an expert opinion on the existence of permanent 
impairment was based on medical evidence other than symptoms. 
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ARGUMENT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(b), 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THERE IS A CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the present case, petitioners are entitled to a Writ of 
Certiorari in accordance with Rule 46(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on the grounds that the Crosland decision conflicts with 
the opinions Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P. 2d at 581 (Utah 1991), 
and Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986). 
Petitioners hereby incorporate the arguments in the briefs of the 
Utah Self-Insurers' Association and The Workers7 Compensation Fund. 
In Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991), 
this Court noted that administrative cases filed after 1988 would 
be subject to review by appellate courts under the Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act. Pursuant to the UAPA, interpretation 
of statutory terms would be given deference if there was "an 
explicit or implicit grant of discretion . . . in the governing 
statute." Id. at 588. Where there is no discernable legislative 
intent, the choice among interpretations is a policy decision and 
"[t]he agency that has been granted authority to administer that 
statute is the body to make such a determination." Id. at 589. 
Hence, without discernable legislative intent, an appellate court 
should not substitute its interpretation of an issue for the 
agency's, since "it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature 
has delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue." Id. 
The Crosland opinion cites the proper standard of review, but 
fails to apply the standard. The court declared that pursuant to 
Morton it was required to interpret an amendment "to the Workers7 
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Compensation Act and thus presents a question of statutory 
construction and legislative intent which we may review for 
correctness." 18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. However, the court was 
obligated to defer to the Commission's interpretation of "permanent 
impairment" under Morton, since the court failed to describe any 
discernable express or implied legislative intent. Moreover, 
pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act the Commission has 
discretion to apply its expertise as discussed in the brief of the 
Utah Self-Insurers7 Association. 
In Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 
1986), Justices Zimmerman and Howe joined in a concurring opinion 
and specifically rejected the theory that preexisting conditions 
had to evidence manifest symptoms as a prerequisite to 
apportionment. Latent, preexisting conditions had important public 
policy considerations for impaired and disabled employees: 
[T]he question is whether the worker came to the workplace 
with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If he did 
and that condition contributed to the injury, then Allen's 
higher standard of legal causation comes into play so as to 
place that worker on the same footing as one who did not come 
to work with a preexisting condition. 
. . . 
To rule otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a 
worker who has a preexisting condition and whose virtually 
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at work will be able 
to foist the cost of that injury on his employer when the 
workplace had little to do with causing the injury. 
Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals accepted the applicant's fallacious 
argument that the absence of symptoms prior to the industrial 
accident was tantamount to an absence of permanent impairment. This 
argument contradicts the undisputed medical evidence in the Report 
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of Medical Panel and the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment that claimant had a ten percent permanent impairment 
that existed prior to the industrial accident. The Court of 
Appeals erroneously failed to defer to the Commission's finding 
that the undisputed medical evidence was that claimant had a ten 
percent permanent impairment that preexisted the industrial 
accident under an abuse of discretion standard of review in its 
interpretation of the terms "any permanent impairment." 
Consequently, Crosland rejects the public policy concerns in 
Holloway v. Industrial Commission that asymptomatic, preexisting 
conditions are the sole responsibility of the employer and cannot 
be apportioned in a permanent partial disability award. 
ARGUMENT III 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO RULE 4 6(a), 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, SINCE THERE IS A CONFLICT 
BETWEEN PANELS OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioners are entitled to a Writ of Certiorari on the 
grounds that the opinions of panels of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Crosland v. Board of Review and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 
800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), directly conflict, within the 
meaning of Rule 46(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In 
Croslandr the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the Commission shall 
not apportion permanent partial disability compensation between 
asymptomatic, preexisting conditions and an industrial injury. In 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
the claim and ordered the Commission to apportion the permanent 
total disability compensation between the asymptomatic, preexisting 
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conditions and the industrial injury. Thus, there is a manifest 
conflict between these decisions by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In Nyrehn the court found that the critical finding of fact in 
a claim that includes a preexisting permanent impairment is whether 
the preexisting impairment contributed to the industrial accident, 
not whether it was asymptomatic. The ALJ awarded permanent total 
disability benefits to the claimant, but found that the applicant's 
preexisting, asymptomatic spondylolisthesis caused 25% of her 
permanent impairment and only the impairment in excess of 25% was 
compensable. The Industrial Commission overruled the ALJ and 
denied applicant's claim for failure to meet the higher standard of 
legal causation required for preexisting injuries by Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986). The court rejected 
the Commission's application of a higher legal standard under Allen 
on trie grounds that there was no medical evidence that the 
asymptomatic, preexisting "condition contributed to the industrial 
injury." 800 P.2d at 334 (citations omitted). 
The court admonished the Commission and the ALJ to make 
express findings of fact on all material issues, particularly 
whether the applicant's preexisting condition contributed to her 
injury and remanded the claim for an award of benefits in 
accordance with the allocation of permanent impairment between the 
preexisting and industrial injuries on the grounds that the 
applicant's claim satisfied the higher standard of legal causation 
under the Allen decision. Id. 
In the present case, the Medical Panel made two distinct 
findings of fact that the asymptomatic, preexisting condition 
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contributed to the industrial injury and that the claimant would 
not have had the degree of difficulty had he not had the 
developmental abnormality, 
Crosland found that § 35-1-66 does not apportion between the 
employer and the employee for symptoms resulting from one 
industrial accident. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. The court noted in 
a footnote that apportionment was only allowed between the employer 
and the Employer's Compensation Fund [sic] under § 35-1-69. Id. at 
n. 6 38. However, the court failed to recognize that in Utah the 
sole basis for apportionment depends on whether the claim is for 
permanent total or permanent partial disability. Whether 
apportionment is between the employee and the Employers7 
Reinsurance Fund is irrelevant. The 1988 amendments eliminated 
apportionment between the employer and the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund, but had no affect on apportionment. Indeed, the ALT noted in 
the conclusions of law that § 35-1-69 required "that the carrier 
pay only for the impairment that is related to the industrial 
injury, and unfortunately, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund no 
longer is required to contribute with respect to impairment 
aggravated by the industrial injury." Furthermore, the Utah Court 
of Appeals held that the "amendment does more than to [sic] clarify 
that an employer is free from liability for an employee's 
preexisting ratable functional impairment not caused by the 
industrial accident." The court failed to cite any authority for 
this principle and the term "functional" is not part of § 35-1-66. 
The assessment of permanent impairment is a medical matter 
reserved exclusively for physicians; not lawyers, judges, or 
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commissioners. The extent of a claimant's disability is assessed 
by nonmedical means, but interpretations of disability are entirely 
different and inapplicable to a statute specifically limited to 
"any permanent impairment.11 In the present case, the "impairment" 
from applicant's preexisting, asymptomatic developmental 
abnormalities was an express finding of fact by the impartial 
Medical Panel. Section 35-1-66 mentions "disability," but the 
statute explicitly states that "compensation may not be paid for 
any permanent impairment that existed prior to an industrial 
accident." 
ARGUMENT IV 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(d), 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
IT IS AN IMPORTANT STATE LAW QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
Petitioners seek a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46(d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on the grounds that the Crosland 
opinion is an issue of first impression to this Court and vitally 
affects all Utah employers and employees. Petitioners hereby 
incorporate the arguments in the briefs of the Utah Self-Insurers' 
Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. Indeed, 
the fact that a majority of the employers in Utah, through their 
representatives, have filed amicus curiae briefs shows the 
significant concern that Crosland will adversely impact the 
traditional exposure for workers7 compensation insurers and self-
insurers. 
The 1988 amendments did not eliminate apportionment between 
preexisting and industrial injuries in § 35-1-66. The 1988 
amendment to § 35-1-66 retained the accepted and usual principle 
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first mandated in Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, 562 P. 2d 617 
(Utah 1977), that an employer is not liable for permanent partial 
disability compensation attributed to manifested or quiescent 
preexisting conditions. More recently, in Large v. Industrial 
Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah App. 1988), the court noted 
that "where the disability is the result of preexisting conditions 
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is not entitled to 
disability benefits." 
The legislative intent for amendment of § 35-1-66 was to 
eliminate the liability of the Second Injury Fund for permanent 
partial disability compensation, not to transfer liability for 
preexisting conditions from the Second Injury Fund to the employer. 
(See affidavit of Stuart L. Poelman attached in Appendix "D.") 
The Industrial Commission cannot consistently apply the 
redefined terms "any permanent impairment" as required by the 
Crosland decision in the three areas that rely on the identical 
terms: §§ 3 5-1-66 and 69, for permanent total and permanent 
partial disability, and claims under the higher standard of legal 
causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d at 15. 
After Crosland, the Commission must apply different meanings for 
"any permanent impairment" for the higher legal causation analysis, 
and the permanent total and permanent partial disability 
compensation. Under Crosland, the higher legal causation test 
cannot be triggered for asymptomatic, preexisting conditions. 
Similarly, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may now allege that the 
definition of "permanent impairment" entitles the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund to refuse to reimburse insurers in permanent total 
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disability claims where there is evidence of any asymptomatic, 
preexisting condition. These different definitions for the same 
medical term of art will lead to unnecessary inconsistency, 
confusion, and litigation. If the Crosland definition is used in 
these other contexts employers will be inequitably asked to 
shoulder exorbitant disability awards and the whole nature of how 
employers do business in Utah will be changed. Utah employers may 
attempt to hire workers without asymptomatic, preexisting 
impairments in direct contravention of Holloway v. Industrial 
Commission and other decisions by the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Workers' Compensation Act mandates that an employer is 
only liable for permanent impairment attributed to an industrial 
accident, not for preexisting permanent impairment. The ALT and 
Industrial Commission must merely make findings of fact that any 
asymptomatic, preexisting impairment was permanent and 
contributory. In the present case, there were express findings 
that the preexisting, asymptomatic developmental abnormalities in 
claimant's spine were permanent and contributory. Section 35-1-66 
does not expressly or impliedly require "functional" or "disabling" 
impairment and the Utah Court of Appeals improperly redefined the 
statute contrary to the expert medical evidence and the Guides to 
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Disability is assessed by 
nonmedical means and the court would have been entitled to 
interject itself in the interpretation of claimant's disability. 
However, under the Guides impairment is a medical matter that is 
assessed exclusively by medical means and the court improperly 
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substituted its definition of the term "impairment" for the precise 
meaning used by the Panel. Applicant should have objected to the 
Report of Medical Panel in the event he disagreed with the Panel's 
findings. 
Pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, § 35-1-66, 
petitioners are only liable for applicant's permanent impairment in 
excess of the ten percent permanent impairment that the Medical 
Panel found existed prior to the industrial accident. 
Petitioners are entitled to a Writ of Certiorari under Rule 
46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on the grounds that Crosland 
directly conflicts with decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals. In addition, Crosland drastically alters 
the traditional rule that the employer is not liable for 
preexisting conditions in accordance with sound public policy to 
hire impaired workers. 
WHEREFORE, petitioners, Young Electric Sign Co. and Smith 
Administrators, now doing business as Administrative Services, 
Inc. , respectfully request that the decision Crosland v. Industrial 
Commission be reversed and that the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the ALJ and Industrial Commission of Utah be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1992. 
J.LXngus 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
Edwards 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I, J, Angus Edwards, certify that on May 20, 1992, I served a 
copy of the attached PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI upon Virginius 
Dabney, counsel for the Applicant in this matter, by mailing it to 
him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the 
following address: 
Virginius Dabney 
DABNEY & DABNEY 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J.( Angus ^awards 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
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proficient in his work. General 
knowledge or expertise acquired 
through employment in a common 
calling cannot be appropriated as a 
trade secret. "The efficiency and 
skills which an employee develops 
through his work belong to him and 
not to his former employer." Hall-
mark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v. 
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d 
933, 936 (1978). The same principles 
apply to the covenant here. We 
hold that the covenant not to 
compete had the effect of preven-
ting the defendant from exploiting 
skills and experience which he had a 
right to exploit. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court and the majority ignore the 
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If 
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to 
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have 
made the requisite showing under Rule 
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief 
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial 
court can conclude that a covenant not to 
compete is enforceable, it must first determine 
that the employee was not engaged in a 
common calling and that the employer has a 
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at 
627. A generalized assertion that preventing 
the completion of a former employee will 
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough. 
Id. at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 
426. 
In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a 
salesman of butcher supplies. He was a route 
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural 
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade 
secrets. He was not involved in management. 
As a result of his common calling, he necess-
arily knew both the actual and potential cus-
tomers for the goods he sold in the commun-
ities of his territory. Customers of butcher 
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a 
scan of local telephone books would quickly 
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are 
not found on a secret customer list. 
The majority does not even address the issue 
of whether Benson was engaged in a common 
calling. It rests solely on the specious rationale 
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route 
salespersons are commonly viewed in their 
territories as representatives of their emplo-
yers. But that is no reason to hold them in 
semi-bondage to their former employers 
when they change jobs. The majority notes 
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five sal-
espersons. The law, however, does not protect 
only less able individuals. 
The consequence of the majority's ruling is 
that a noncompetition covenant may be enf-
orced against any route salesperson whenever 
it could be said that the employer may lose 
ird of Review ~-
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some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former 
employee is not restrained from competing. 
That, of course, can be said with respect to all 
route salespersons, no matter how common 
their callings. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. 
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be mod-
ified after it goes into effect. However, the law is 
that a movant must first show some change in circ-
umstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed cir-
cumstances that bear upon the issue of when the 
injunction should have commenced. 
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a pro-
fessional person solely responsible for building the 
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Gary E. CROSLAND, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah; Young Electric Sign 
Co.; and Smith Administrators, 
Respondents. 
No. 910291-CA 
FILED: March 20, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
Virginius Dabncy, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioner 
J. Angus Edwards, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Petitioner, Gary Crosland (Crosland), seeks 
review of an Industrial Commission order 
awarding him compensation for one-half of 
his industrial accident injury and denying 
compensation for the remainder. Crosland was 
denied compensation for the half of the injury 
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of 
a preexisting asymptomatic condition. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 9, 1989, Crosland injured his 
lower back as he attempted to help another 
employee move a 200-pound sign while 
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign 
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when, 
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted 
his upper torso. When he could barely walk 
the next day at work, his employer sent him 
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating 
physician concluded that Crosland had a pre-
existing asymptomatic defect and that the 
industrial accident caused the defect to become 
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adju-
ster's examining physician determined that 
Crosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spo-
ndylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of 
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis 
(forward movement of the body of one of the 
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below 
it), adding that all the present symptoms 
Crosland suffered were related to the indust-
rial injury. Crosland had never had any back 
problems or required medical treatment for his 
back prior to this accident. 
The medical panel appointed by the Admi-
nistrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that follo-
wing the accident, Crosland had a twenty 
percent permanent partial impairment of the 
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten 
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the 
industrial accident and half to the asympto-
matic preexisting condition medically aggrav-
ated by the accident. The panel commented 
that "[i]t is entirely possible he could have 
gone on for an indefinite period had it not 
been for the event described, but it is unlikely 
he would have had the degree of difficulty had 
he not had the developmental abnormality." 
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied 
Crosland compensation for the ten percent 
permanent partial impairment attributable to 
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggr-
avated by the industrial accident, thus allo-
wing compensation only for the ten percent 
whole body permanent partial impairment 
attributable to the industrial accident itself. 
The Industrial Commission affirmed. 
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should 
receive compensation for the entire twenty 
percent whole person permanent partial imp-
airment caused by the industrial accident's 
aggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic 
condition. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This proceeding is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah 
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 & 
Supp. 1991).* Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
governs the scope of our review of the Indu-
strial Commission's order, allowing relief if 
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced" 
because "the agency has erroneously interpr-
eted or applied the law." In Morton Int'l, Inc. 
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm% 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991), 
the supreme court held that under this section 
we may review for correctness and need not 
defer to the agency's interpretation unless 
—
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there is "a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from 
the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When 
legislative intent can be discerned, however, 
we give the agency's interpretation no defer-
ence, id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of 
Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 
1991). This case requires an interpretation of 
the 1988 amendment to the Workers' Comp-
ensation Act and thus presents a question of 
statutory construction and legislative intent 
which we may review foir correctness. Under 
this higher standard, to afford relief we must 
find that the Commission erroneously interp-
reted the law to Crosland's substantial prej-
udice. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an 
industrial injury and that he has satisfied both 
the medical and legal cause requirements of 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986).3 The sole issue on appeal is 
- whether Crosland should receive compensation 
for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting 
condition which was aggravated by his indus-
trial accident and contributed to the injury. 
Utah courts have followed the well-
established common law rule that when an 
industrial accident lights up or aggravates a 
preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting 
disability is compensable as long as the indu-
strial accident was the medical and legal cause 
of the injury. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Const, 
and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 
1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum 
to add the higher standard for legal 
cause when preexisting conditions are invo-
lved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus. 
Comm% 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App. 
1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received 
compensation for detached retina resulting 
from work-related accident, even though 
employee's prior cataract surgery rendered 
him somewhat predisposed to retinal detach-
ment). This rule is consistent with the stated 
policy of liberally construing and applying the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide 
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of 
| affording financial security to injured emplo-
yees. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
! Comm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted). In addition, the rule com-
I ports with Professor Larson's comments: 
Nothing is better established in 
compensation law than the rule 
that, when industrial injury preci-
pitates disability from a latent prior 
condition, such as heart disease, 
cancer, back weakness and the like, 
the entire disability is compensable, 
and except in states having special 
LNCE REPORTS 
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statutes on aggravation of disease, 
no attempt is made to weigh the 
relative contribution of the accident 
and the preexisting condition to the 
final disability or death. Apportio-
nment does not apply in such cases, 
nor in any case in which the prior 
condition was not a disability in the 
compensation sense. 
2 Larson, Workmen*s Compensation Law, 
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
Juxtaposed against this strong common law 
background allowing an employee compensa-
tion for aggravation of a preexisting latent 
condition is the policy of freeing an employer 
from liability for an employee disability exis-
ting prior to the work-related accident. For 
permanent partial impairments, this policy is 
effectuated by the medical and legal causation 
requirements of Allen.4 In addition, by ame-
ndment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature 
added the following language to the Workers' 
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disa-
bility compensation may not be paid for any-
permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident/ Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
66 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called 
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic 
weakness in Crosland's back was a 
"permanent impairment" within the meaning 
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The 
stated purpose of this amendment to section 
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial 
disability compensation entitlements are based 
on physical impairment caused by an indust-
rial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no. 
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret 
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude 
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to 
include only conditions "[connoting] some 
deterioration or diminishment in function." 
This definition comports with the use of the 
word "permanent impairment" at the begin-
ning of amended section 35-1-66, stating, 
with our emphasis, that an employee who 
receives a "permanent impairment as a result 
of an industrial accident ... may receive a 
permanent partial disability award." This 
wording implies functional "permanent imp-
airment" and does not include asymptomatic 
nonratable conditions. 
This interpretation is also in line with deci-
sions in other states, which have allowed for 
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama 
courts, for example, have refused to require 
employees to accept reduced compensation for 
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexi-
sting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper 
Co. v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity" 
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced 
compensation for employee with preexisting 
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a 
fundamental principle that an employer take[s] 
the employee subject to his physical condition 
when he starts his employment"); see also Ter-
williger v. Green Fuel Economizer, Inc., 
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no 
apportionment when preexisting condition was 
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State 
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state 
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment 
must be definitely ascertained and rated; 
general rule is that apportionment statutes do 
not apply when "the prior condition was not 
physically disabling"). 
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned 
between the employer and the employee liab-
ility for symptoms resulting from one indust-
rial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude 
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires 
apportionment of liability for aggravation of 
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find 
that the amendment does more than to clarify 
that an employer is free from liability for an 
employee's preexisting ratable functional 
impairment not caused by the industrial acci-
dent. Based on the usage of the term 
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and 
on Utah case law at the time of the injury, 
which allowed full compensation for aggrav-
ation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition, 
we believe the term "permanent impairment" 
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable 
physical condition exhibiting some diminished 
function. Because Crosland's back was com-
pletely functional prior to the industrial acci-
dent and could have continued to be functi-
onal absent the accident, we conclude that 
apportionment was inappropriate in this case 
and that the Commission erroneously failed to 
award full compensation for Crosland's 
twenty percent whole person permanent partial 
impairment caused by the industrial accident. 
We reverse the order of the Industrial Com-
mission. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. The UAPA governs all administrative proceedings 
commenced after January 1,1988. 
2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied 
when the terms of the statute leave the specific 
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than 
one permissible reading of the statute. The choice 
among permissible interpretations might then be 
deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we 
would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse 
of the delegated discretion. Morton InVl, 814 P.2d 
at 587-89. 
3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of 
Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury must show that his work-
related exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in 
excess of the normally expected level of nonemplo-
yment activity for men and women in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26. 
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting 
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion suffices to 
prove legal cause. Id. (citing IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That 
Crosland's exertion in lifting the sign was greater 
than normal is undisputed in this case. Conseque-
ntly, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen 
rule under the amended statute. 
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is 
accomplished by providing the employer contribu-
tion from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See 
note 6. 
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Com-
pensation Act defines the terms "impairment" and 
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medic-
ally impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
"'Impairment' is a purely medical condition refle-
cting any anatomical or functional abnormality or 
loss." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991) 
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definit-
ions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's 
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the 
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on 
the law as it existed at the time of the injury. 
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the 
employer and the Employers' Compensation Fund 
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which, 
with our emphasis, states in pertinent pan, 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% 
whole person permanent impairment 
from any cause or origin, subsequently 
incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, and if 
the additional impairment results in 
permanent total disability, the employer 
or its insurance carrier and the Emplo-
yers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for 
the payment of benefits as follows:... 
This provision thus fully compensates an employee 
when an industrial accident and a preexisting imp-
airment result in permanent total disability, without 
imposing the complete burden of compensation for 
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of 
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the 
problems arising when the sum of two injuries is 
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident 
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already 
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total 
disability), without discouraging employers from 
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is com-
pensated for the permanent total disability, but the 
employer is partially compensated from the fund so 
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g., 
Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178 
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal 
connection between the preexisting impairment and 
the industrial injury is not required; only that they 
cumulatively result in substantially greater disabi-
lity); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award, 
the Commission relied upon Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Conwn'fl, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is 
misplaced because the Nyrehn cast merely apport-
ions between the employer and the fund under this 
section and does not address the issue of apportio-
nment between the employer and the employee. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge-
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a 
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring 
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We 
reverse. 
On February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a 
complaint pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11 
(1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex 
parte protective order. Plaintiffs pro se 
complaint stated defendant, threatened to kill 
her if she served him with divorce papers. 
On February 28, 1991, both parties appe-
ared in court without counsel. The judge 
stated that he had reviewed the complaint 
seeking a protective order. Before hearing any 
testimony, the judge stated he was going to 
dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision, 
the judge continued: 
I understand that you may be in 
fear, but this is an improper use of 
the protective order. The protective 
order is intended to cover those 
circumstances where one is in, what 
we call imminent fear. An imminent 
fear doesn't mean that you may 
anticipate some future problem. It 
means that you are in fear of some 
present problem. That is if there is 
an immediate threat. This threat is 
based upon your fear that if you 
file divorce papers that you may be 
in jeopardy. You have every right 
to file divorce papers. You have 
every right in that proceeding to 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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not it would need additional employees, would 
perform the work in the normal course of its 
trade or business. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, 
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence 
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
his personal residence may not be considered an 
employee or employer solely by operation of Sub-
section (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship may not be considered an em-
ployee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an em-
ployee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his em-
ployer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate payment of direct compensation, 
which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or 
shared control or responsibility. 
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(ii): 
(i) a partner of a partnership and an 
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed 
to have had or shared control or responsibil-
ity for any failure to insure or otherwise pro-
vide adequate payment of direct compensa-
tion, the burden of proof being on any person 
seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing 
that a partner of a partnership or an owner 
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control 
or responsibility for any failure to insure or 
otherwise provide adequate payment of di-
rect compensation may only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection 
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov-
erage under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(b). 1968 
35-1-43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen," 
and "operative" defined — Mining les-
sees and sublessees — Partners and 
sole proprietors — Corporate officers 
and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workmen," and "operative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and 
any other person, in the service of the state, or of 
any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, 
town, or school district under any election or ap-
pointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learn-
ing; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, 
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but 
not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em-
ployer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of 
m i n i n g nrrm^T-fv a*wl —«u 1 J - . t - i 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the 
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this 
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent 
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such 
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar 
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur-
ance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chap-
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be 
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of 
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee 
under this chapter until this notice has been 
given. For premium rate making, the insurance 
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the 
employee to be 150% of the state's average 
weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an em-
ployee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon 
its insurance carrier and upon the commission 
naming the persons to be excluded from cover-
age. A director or officer of a corporation is con-
sidered an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec-
tion 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for 
a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from 
real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso-
ciated broker are performed under a written con-
tract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as 
an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av-
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in Section 35-1-75. 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this title. 
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically im-
paired as to function. Disability can be total or 
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or 
nonindustrial. 
(5) "General order" means an order applyinS 
generally throughout the state to all persons, em-
ployments, or places of employment of a class un-
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other 
orders of the commission shall be considered spe-
cial orders. 
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition 
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mality or loss. Impairment may be either tempo-
rary o r permanent , industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regula-
tion, direction, requirement or standard of the 
commission, or any other determination arrived 
at, or decision made, by the commission. 
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising 
out of and in the course of employment" in-
cludes any injury caused by the willful act of 
a third person directed against an employee 
because of his employment. 
(b) The term does not include a disease, 
except as the disease results from the injury. 
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any em-
ployment or place of employment, means the 
freedom from danger to the life, health, or wel-
fare of employees reasonably permitted by the 
nature of the employment. 
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and 
moral well-being. iwi 
j5_l45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
;njured and the dependents of each such employee 
*ho is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
.t>urse of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
rjrred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
dicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
?n account of the injury or death, and such amount 
tor medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
nnes, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
fipenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
Mlity for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
>n the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
:he employee. 1988 
JS-146. Employers to secure workers* compen-
sation benefits for employees — 
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunc-
tion — Violation. 
<1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, 
ind school districts, shall secure the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence within 30 days after any final 
award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with any stock corpo-
ration or mutual association authorized to t rans-
act the business of workers ' compensation insur-
ance in this s tate , which payments shall com-
mence within 30 days after any final award by 
the commission; or 
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner , and 
when due as provided for in this t i t le, which pay-
ments shall commence within 30 days after any 
anal award by the commission. In these cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the de-
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to 
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as 
they are incurred, and may a t amy t ime change or 
Modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if 
in its judgment this action is necessary or desir-
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with 
*H the provisions of law relat ing to the payment 
of compensation and the furnishing of medical 
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and bur-
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de-
pendents of killed employees. The commission 
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi-
lege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter, 
from further operation of the employer's business, 
where the employer has failed to provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, 
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the 
employer's business until the payment of these bene-
fits has been secured by the employer as required by 
this section. The court may enjoin the employer with-
out requiring bond from the commission. 
(3) If the commission has reason to believe tha t an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a 
business without securing the payment of compensa-
tion in one of the three ways provided in this section, 
the commission may give such employer five days ' 
writ ten notice by registered mail of such noncompli-
ance and if the employer within said period does not 
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as 
provided in this section and the court is empowered, 
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the further operation of the em-
ployer's business. 1989 
35-1-46.10. Not ice of n o n c o m p l i a n c e to em-
ployer — Enforcement power of com-
mission — Penalty. 
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe t h a t 
an employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, t he 
commission may give tha t employer writ ten notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known 
address of the employer. 
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default 
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the com-
mission may issue an order requiring the employer to 
appear before the commission and show cause why 
the employer should not be ordered to comply with 
the provisions of Section 35-1-46. 
(3) If it is found tha t the employer has failed to 
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three 
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission 
may order any employer to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 35-1-46. 
(4) The conunission may also impose, a t the t ime of 
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not 
more than one and one-half times the amount of the 
premium the employer would have paid for workers ' 
compensation insurance had tha t employer been in-
sured by the Workers' Compensation Fund of U t a h 
during the period of noncompliance. 
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107 
and used for the purposes of tha t fund. 1987 
35-1-46.20. Requirements of any order of the 
commission — Court enforcement 
Any order issued by the commission under author-
ity of Section 35-1-46.10 shall be in writing, shall be 
sent by registered mail to the last known address of 
the employer, and shall s tate the findings and order 
of the commission. The order shall specify its effective 
date, which may be immediate or may be a t a la ter 
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-lion 
shall also be payable for the first three 
2ter the injury is received. 1973 
- Temporary disability — Amount of 
** payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
In case of temporary disability, the employee 
v
 receive 662/a% of that employee's average 
*zl\ wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
h lity is total, but not more than a maximum of 




 jury per week and not less than a minimum of 
**Vn<!r week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
Bch dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
* 'maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
* * J the average weekly wage of the employee at 
#s
*\jjne °f tne inJurv» D u t n o t to e x c e e d 100% of the 
**
 average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
**
 week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
^ e d 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
rtge weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
Lflod of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
ujned prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
^very, and when no such light duty employment is 
mailable to the employee from the employer, tempo-
nr\ disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
•2i The "state average weekly wage** as referred to 
n Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
Zy the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
^ch year, the total wages reported on contribution 
rrports to the department of employment security un-
itr the commission for the preceding calendar year 
ihall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
he divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
is the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
1961 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — 
Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability 
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compen-
sation equal to: 
(a) 662/a% of the difference between the em-
ployee's average weekly wages before the acci-
dent and the weekly wages the employee is able 
to earn after the accident, but not more than 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but 
only up to a total weekly compensation that does 
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for tempo-
rary partial disability for work at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from 
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under 
Section 35-1-98. 
(3) The duration oi weemy payments may not ex-
ceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years 
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate 
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
1990 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
ment as a result of an industrial accident and who 
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 
may receive a permanent partial disability award 
from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue 
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured 
person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensa-
tion shall be 662/a% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 662/s% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to 
exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated 
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in ad-
dition to the compensation provided for temporary 
total disability and temporary partial disability: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter 
amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above 
deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and 
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal 
to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(2)(a) At wrist or midcarpal or 
midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(2Kb) All fingers except thumb at meta-
carpophalangeal joint 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of carpometacarpal 
bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone ....34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At interphalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 8 
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(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or 
with resection of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pel-
vis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or 
less below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional 
stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes am-
putation or below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below intercondylar 
notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional 
stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Footatankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Cho-
part's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal 
amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal 
bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal 
joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint ..12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal 
bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal 
joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal 
joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal 
joint 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing . 109 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall 
be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Par-
tial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percent-
age of the complete loss or loss of use of the mem-
ber. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to 
the items listed in (B)(4). 
For any permanent impairment caused by an 
industrial accident that is not otherwise provided 
for in the schedule of losses in this section, per-
manent partial disability compensation shall be 
awarded by the commission based on the medical 
evidence. Compensation for any such impairment 
shall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to 
the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this 
section. Permanent partial disability compensa-
tion may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, 
which shall be considered the period of compen-
sation for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
Permanent partial disability compensation may 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that 
existed prior to an industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all 
of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage attk 
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeki 
compensation be required to be paid. * 
35-1-66.1. Loss of hearing — Occupational he* 
ing loss due to noise to be comp^ 
sated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposun t. 
harmful industrial noise or by direct head inj^ 
shall be compensated according to the terms and cat 
ditions of this chapter. 
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss fo 
harmful industrial noise shall be paid under tL 
chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a prof* 
sionally controlled sound test that the employee h* 
been exposed to harmful industrial noise as define 
in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the employ* 
against whom the claim is made. j * 
35-1-66*2. Harmful industrial noise defined. 
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as ti> 
sound emanating from equipment and machines dur 
ing employment exceeding the following permissibU 
sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding 





















(2) Harmful industrial noise is also defined i» 
sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudder 
instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or im 
pact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure 
levels. 
(3) The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Divi 
sion of the commission may conduct tests to deter 
mine the intensity of noise at places of employment 
The administrative law judge may consider such 
tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in w 
field of sound engineering, as evidence of harmful 
industrial noise. xm 
35-1-66.3. Loss of hearing defined. 
Loss of hearing is defined as binaural hearing to* 
measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,0ft-
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz). If the aver 
age decibel loss at 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycle* 
per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels or less, usually no 
hearing impairment exists. l* 
35-1-66.4. Measuring hearing loss. . . 
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established 
no sooner than six weeks after termination of expo-
sure to the harmful industrial noise, by audiometry 
determination of hearing threshold level perfornI 
by medical or paramedical professionals recogni 
by the commission, as measured from 0 decibels on 
audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, America" 
National Standard "Specifications for Audiometer* 
(1969). . 
(2) In any evaluation of occupational hearing J^ 
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cemed do not exceed the maximum provided for 
by law. 1990 
35.1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund. 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole per-
gon permanent impairment from any cause or origin, 
subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployee's employment, and if the additional impair-
ment results in permanent total disability, the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier and the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of bene-
fits as follows: 
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is lia-
ble for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and 
the initial three years of permanent total disabil-
ity compensation as provided in this title. 
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of 
the first $20,000 shall be paid in the first in-
stance by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Then, as provided in Subsection (5), the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the 
employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those 
expenses. 
(3) After the initial three-year period under 
Subsection (1) permanent total disability com-
pensation payable to an employee under this title 
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(4) If it is determined that the employee is per-
manently and totally disabled, the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be given credit for all 
prior payments of temporary total, temporary 
partial, and permanent partial disability com-
pensation made as a result of the industrial acci-
dent. Any overpayment by the employer or its 
insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6). 
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse 
the employer or its insurance carrier for the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical 
benefits and compensation paid to or on behalf of 
an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied 
by satisfactory evidence of payment of the medi-
cal or disability compensation for which the re-
imbursement is requested. Each request is sub-
ject to review as to reasonableness by the com-
mission. The commission may determine the 
manner of reimbursement. 
(6) If, at the time an employee is determined to 
be permanently and totally disabled, the em-
ployee has other actionable workers' compensa-
tion claims, the employer or insurance carrier 
that is liable for the last industrial accident re-
sulting in permanent total disability shall be lia-
ble for the benefits payable by the employer as 
provided in this section. The employee's entitle-
ment to benefits for prior actionable claims shall 
then be determined separately on the facts of 
those claims. Any previous permanent partial 
disability arising out of those claims shall then 
be considered to be impairments that give rise to 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liability under 
this section. isss 
&1-70. Additional benefits in special cases. 
h* any wholly dependent persons, who have been 
g iv ing the benefits of this title, at the termination 
of
 such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled 
to additional benefits, the industrial commission 
may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such bene-
fits; but the liability of the employer or insurance 
carrier involved shall not be extended, and the addi-
tional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special 
fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 
35-1-68. i9ss 
35-1-71. Dependents — Presumption. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased em-
ployee: 
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over 
if physically or mentally incapacitated and de-
pendent upon the parent, with whom they are 
living at the time of the death of such parent, or 
who is legally bound for their support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under 
Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a)(i), a surviving husband 
or wife shall be presumed to be wholly dependent 
upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the 
time of the employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in 
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance 
with the facts in each particular case existing at the 
time of the injury or death of such employee, except 
for purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection 
35-l-68(2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a 
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family 
of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of hus-
band or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother 
or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall 
include a posthumous child, and a child legally 
adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half 
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or Bis-
ter" as above used. 1967 
35-1-72. Alien. 
When any alien dependent of the deceased resides 
outside of the United States of America and any of its 
dependencies and Canada, such dependent shall be 
paid not to exceed one-half the amount provided here-
in. 1953 
35-1-73. Benefits in case of death — Distribution 
of award to dependents — Death of de-
pendents — Remarriage of surviving 
spouse. 
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to such 
one or more of the dependents of the decedent for the 
benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined 
by the commission, which may apportion the benefits 
among the dependents in such manner as it deems 
just and equitable. Payment to a dependent subse-
quent in right may be made, if the commission deems 
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other 
claims therefor. The dependents, or persons to whom 
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of 
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with 
the finding and direction of the commission. In all 
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving 
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be 
sufficient for the widow or widower to make applica-
tion to the commission on behalf of that individual 
and the minor children; and in cases where all of the 
dependents are minors, the application shall be made 
by the guardian or next friend of such minor depen-
dents. The commission may, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the rights and interests of any minor depen-
dents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a 
method of safeguarding any payments due them. 
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die 
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1 0 Introduction 
T he AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (the Guide?) provides a reference framework within which physicians may evalu-
ate and report medical impairment and within which 
nonmedical recipients of information about impairment 
may understand and make appropriate use of the medi-
cal information they receive 
The unique value of the Guides as /^technical 
reference of choice for evaluation of medical impair-
ment, which goes well beyond its broad scope of cover-
age (all body parts and systems), arises from the precise 
application of fundamental medical and scientific 
concepts, the systematic analysis that introduces each 
of the clinical chapters, the detail of the medical evalua-
tion protocols, and the thorough state-of-the-art analy-
ses that underlie the rating tables In addition, a format 
for reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized 
at the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide 
straightforward and well-structured guidelines so that 
reports about the same individual from different observ-
ers are likely to be of comparable content and com-
pleteness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed 
and compared 
As is true of any other technical process, knowing 
the "rules," which in the case of the Guides are the 
specific procedures described in the clinical chapters, 
is not enough The user of the Guides, both physicians 
and nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts 
under which the "rules have been developed and the 
intended approach for using them to achieve objective, 
accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individu-
als with medical impairment This chapter and Chapter 
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the 
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment 
embodied in the Guides 
1.1 Basic Considerations 
Impairment—Disability—Handicap 
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment," 
"disability" and "handicap," appear m laws, regulations 
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordina-
tion of the ways in which they are used It is no wonder, 
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about 
their meaning The definitions used in the Guides seek 
to remedy this confusion through detailed description 
and delineation of the domain m which each term is 
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that 
are important, not the word used as the label Accord-
ingly, even when the terminology of the Guides may 
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a 
particular law, regulation or administrative system, anal-
ysis of the context in accordance with the following 
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied 
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within 
the provisions of a particular disability system 
The accurate and proper use of medical informa-
tion to assess impairment in connection with disability 
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas 
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impairment is a medical matter, disability arises out 
of the interaction between impairment and external 
demands. Consequently, as used in the Guides, 
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's 
health status that is assessed by medical means', "dis-
ability" which is assessed by nonmedical means, 
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet 
personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet 
statutory or regulatory requirements. Simply stated, 
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an 
individual; "disability" is the gap between what the 
individual can do and what the individual needs or 
wants to do. 
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessar-
ily "disabled." Impairment gives rise to disability only 
when the medical condition limits the individual's capac-
ity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields 
and activities.1 On the other hand, if the individual is 
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual 
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even 
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment. 
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet inde-
pendent of, both "impairment" and "disability," although 
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of 
these terms. Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an 
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits one 
or more life activities, including work, has a record of 
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an 
impairment3 The terms of this definition are so indefi-
nite and broad that, technically, almost any person who 
desires to do so might be included in the class of the 
handicapped under the law. 
As a matter of practicality, however, a "handicap" 
may be operationally understood as being manifest in 
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional 
activity. An individual with limited functional capacity 
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment 
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by 
compensating in some way for the effects of an impair-
ment Such compensation, or, more technically, 
"accommodation," normally entails the use of assistive 
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids, 
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equip-
ment), modification of the environment, and/or modifi-
cation of tasks or activities (such as increased time for 
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks). Any 
1. The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth 
finger of the left hand illustrates the point. If the individual is a bank 
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other 
hand, a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled. 
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
one these modalities, or all in combination, may be 
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome 
a barrier to an objective. If the individual is not able 
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation, 
or if there is no accommodation that will enable the 
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handi-
capped, the individual is also disabled. On the other 
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish 
a task or activity without accommodation is, with 
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped 
nor disabled. 
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance of examining the context in which the terms 
"impairment," "disability," or "handicap" appear to avoid 
being misled by imprecise usage. For example, refer-
ence to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be 
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an 
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides, 
an evaluation of impairment. The physician does not 
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the 
purpose of paying a disability benefit. 
Employability—Management/ 
Administrative Considerations 
The concept of "employability" deserves special atten-
tion, for in an occupational setting, if an individual, 
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the 
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the 
job demands and conditions of employment as defined 
by the employer, the individual is employable, and, 
consequently, not disabled. As an operational matter, 
employability is critically related to an individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the 
employer is willing to pay wages. If the individual has 
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment, 
then the individual is not disabled for that job. When 
these capacities are called into question, for whatever 
reason, the employer must carry out an "employability 
determination." 
As in determination of disability, there are both 
administrative and medical components to the employ-
ability determination, the process by which an employer 
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suit-
ability for employment. On the administrative side, 
management will specifically assess performance capa-
bility to estimate the likelihood of a performance failure 
3. The law does not make clear by whom the individual must be 
"regarded" as being handicapped.There are cases on record in which an 
employer "accommodated" the individual even though there was no 
clear evidence or record of medical impairment In these cases, it was 
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the 
law because the employer, by offering accommodation, had regarded the 
individual as handicapped 
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as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability in 
case of human failure. If neither likelihood of failure is 
too great, then the individual is considered to be employ-
able in a particular job. This represents a fundamental 
"go" or "no go" determination that there is or is not a 
sufficient match between an individual and the job 
requirements to give further consideration to employ-
ment. It is different from a "desirability" determination, 
which would rank and compare the individuals who 
are employable. 
During the course of employment, there is 
on-going reassessment of an individual's employability 
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and atten-
dance. Employment continues until the employee leaves 
voluntarily or until a change gives rise to a deficiency 
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that reten-
tion in the job can no longer be justified. When an 
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disa-
bled, because of a change in health, or alleges that a 
medical condition has caused a service deficiency, the 
employer has little choice but to conduct an employ-
ability determination and to assess the individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties. Disability, then, is 
the default result when it is determined that the indi-
vidual lacks employability. 
Employability—Medical Considerations 
As noted above, an employable individual has the capac-
ity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and to 
perform assigned tasks and duties. On the other hand, 
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is 
unwilling, to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable. 
The issue of disability arises from the critical questions 
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained 
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical 
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, trav-
eling to and from work, being at work, or performing 
assigned tasks and duties. The answer is found in a 
"medical determination related to employability." 
The first critical task in carrying out a medical 
determination related to employability is to learn about 
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent 
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliabil-
ity, availability, productivity, expected duration of use-
ful service life and any other criteria associated with 
qualification and suitability. Sufficiently detailed infor-
mation from a job analysis will provide a basis upon 
which a physician determines exactly what kinds of 
medical information are needed, and to what degree of 
detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to 
demand criteria. Once the medical information needs 
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evalua-
tion protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a 
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information. 
However, a special medical evaluation may not be 
necessary, for; presumably, an individual who alleges 
disability would already be under the care of a personal 
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition 
is interfering with life activities on or off the job. And, 
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof, the 
place to start, then, is with review of medical informa-
tion already available in the form of medical office and 
hospital records. Through this medium, the physician 
making the determination of employability may com-
municate with the personal physician to learn whatever 
is known about that individual's health so that, in accor-
dance with established medical diagnostic criteria and 
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the 
two physicians may come to agreement about what is 
and is not known medically about the patient and deter-
mine what other information is necessary to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty. This is nothing more or 
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative 
management of their patients. The practice of medicine 
is not an adversary process; and, consequently, by 
relying on communications and decisionmaking proce-
dures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of 
impairment and medical determinations related to 
employability may be managed without confrontation 
between them. With respect to employability, then, the 
medical questions to be answered are whether or not 
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the 
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and 
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks 
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency, 
whether or not the documentation provides reason to 
believe that the medical condition has either caused or 
contributed to the deficiency. 
If review of the documentation does not show 
that the individual has met the required burden of 
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide 
whether or not acquisition of additional medical infor-
mation is likely to enable the individual to do so. Or, 
there may be a need to verify clinical findings con-
tained in the documentation provided. If so, the medi-
cal evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medi-
cal evaluation by any physician; for; in general, two 
4. If the medical condition does not, for example, preclude daily travel to 
and from a physical therapy clinic, then it would be unlikely for the 
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work. Or, if an 
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying gro-
ceries, from doing chores around the house, or from going to the movies, 
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condition 
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace. 
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physicians examining the same patient under the same 
protocol will have approximately the same set of 
findings. Taken with the prior information, the results 
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclu-
sions that can then be compared with the demand 
criteria for the job. This can always be done with credi-
bility and confidence, since the specifications for the 
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to 
begin with. 
When approached in this way, the medical input 
into the employability determination will be quite inde-
pendent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack 
of it Moreover, because this process provides medical 
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting 
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need 
never occur. 
1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides 
Since any person has only one health status and only 
one life situation, given enough information about each, 
it is possible to understand the relationship and interac-
tion between them. Moreover, because the evaluation 
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but 
culminates the evolution of changes in health that result 
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires 
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical 
information with the results of a current clinical evalua-
tion, carried out in accordance with the protocols of the 
Guides, to characterize fully and assess medical impair-
ment Accomplishment of this objective is based on 
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the 
fundamental components of the Guides. 
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the 
kinds of information needed to document the nature of 
an impairment and its consequences, specifies proce-
dures for acquiring the information, and defines a struc-
tured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting 
the information. A summary of these requirements and 
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical 
chapter 
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive 
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific 
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, func-
tion, or system, each developed by recognized medical 
specialty consultants.These protocols are defined in 
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient 
information to describe fully and characterize the cur-
rent clinical status of a medical impairment. 
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference 
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols. If 
the protocols and tables have been followed, the clini-
cal findings may be compared directly to the criteria 
and related to a percentage of impairment with 
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the 
determination. 
Operationally, the key to effective and reliable 
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical 
medical office and hospital records maintained by the 
physicians who have provided care and treatment since 
the onset of the medical condition. Such records com-
prise clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty 
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge 
summaries, operative notes, pathology reports, labora-
tory test reports and the results of special tests and 
diagnostic procedures. Before formal evaluation is car-
ried out under the Guides, analysis of the history and 
course of the medical condition, beginning with the 
circumstances of onset, and including findings on pre-
vious examinations, the course of treatment, responses 
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition 
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an 
impairment is permanent and well stabilized. 
This information gathering and analysis serves as 
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a perma-
nent impairment is carried out. It is most important that 
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary 
to characterize fully the medical condition in accor-
dance with requirements of the Guides; an incomplete 
or partial evaluation is not acceptable. Once this task is 
accomplished, the clinical findings may be compared 
to the clinical information already contained in the 
records about the individual. If the current findings 
are found to be consistent with the results of previous 
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then, 
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as 
appropriate or required, with the reference tables to 
determine the percentage rating of the impairment. 
However, if the findings are not in substantial accor-
dance with the information of record, then, until fur-
ther clinical evaluation resolves the disparities, the 
rating step is meaningless and cannot be carried out. 
This approach takes advantage of the fact that 
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with 
each other orally and in writing to determine what they 
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine 
further what additional information they need to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty. It does not make sense, 
therefore, to manage cases in which there are differing 
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and 
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical 
third party to adjudicate an issue of medical fact! Such 
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differences are best handled through the ordinary pro-
cess of everyday patient management Then, with refer-
ence to the past medical documentation, the medical 
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters 
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physi-
cian and nonphysician users of the Guides may verify 
that sufficient medical information has been assembled 
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment, 
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to sup-
port a rating in accordance with the tables. At that 
point, it is a straightforward matter to verify whether or 
not a numerical rating of impairment is substantiated 
in accordance with the criteria contained in the Guides. 
1.3 Medical Impairment and 
Workers' Compensation 
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation 
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either 
sustains an injury or incurs an illness arising in the 
course of and out of employment is entitled to protec-
tion against financial loss without being required to 
sue the employer In exchange for their having lost the 
right to sue, the workers' compensation system guaran-
tees benefits to all workers who are covered under the 
law and who meet the criteria for award of benefits. 
The types of payments that may be made when a 
claim is approved fall into three categories: 
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages 
due to temporary total disability; 
• payment of medical bills; and 
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent 
disability, partial or total. 
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as 
being related to functional capability or the lack of it 
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability, 
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is 
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is 
to be compensated monetarily. 
Payments are made for temporary total disability 
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to 
work is expected, and the medical condition has not 
stabilized.5 Temporary disability is partial when the indi-
vidual returns to work but is not earning at the prior 
level. 
5. In accordance with the earlier discussion, "temporary total disability" 
occurs when the medical condition precludes the individual from travel-
ing to and from work, being at work, and performing assigned tasks and 
duties. 
A permanent disability award is normally inde-
pendent of the individual's capacity to work and is 
formulated in terms of expected or presumed long-term 
or permanent economic loss associated with a perma-
nent medical impairment, such as; an amputation. Such 
an award may be paid according t:o a schedule that 
specifically associates impairment with certain body 
parts, functions, or systems; examples are amputations, 
loss of sight, and loss of hearing, and a schedule is 
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the 
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which 
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average 
weekly wages. 
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a 
law, in recognition that the "loss o f or "loss of use of" 
the body part, function, or system may be less than 
total, requires determination of trie proportion or per-
centage of loss. For example, in Maryland, the law says: 
In all cases where there has been an amputation 
of a part of any member of the body herein speci-
fied, or the loss of use /^"(emphasis added) any 
part thereof... the Commission shall allow com-
pensation for such proportion of the total num-
ber of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss 
of use of the entire member as the affected or 
amputated portion bears to the whole.6 
Moreover; because not all conditions that can arise 
out of an injury are accounted for in a schedule, back 
injuries, for example, there is likely to be a provision of 
the law similar to the following: 
In all other cases of disability other than those 
specifically enumerated disabilities7...which dis-
ability is partial in character; but permanent in 
quality, the Commission shall determine the por-
tion or percentage by which the industrial use of 
the employee's body was impaired as a result of 
the injury and in determining such portion or 
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industrial 
loss, the Commission shall take into consider-
ation, among other things, the nature of the 
physical injury, the occupation, experience, 
training, and age of the injured employee, and 
shall award compensation in such proportion 
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks...9 
(emphasis added) 
6. Workmen's Compensation Law of Maryland, Annotated, 1983, Art 
101, §36(3). 
7. Note the context with which "disability' and "disabilies" are used. 
Clearly, the terms should be read as "impairment" and "impairments." 
8. Should this read "disability"? 
9.Ibid.Ait\0\,36(4)(a). 
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While medical information is necessary for the decision 
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that 
information. Neither in this example nor in general is 
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical 
condition may be combined with knowledge of the 
other factors to calculate the percentage by which 
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired. 
Accordingly, each commissioner or hearing official must 
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assess-
ment of the available medical and nonmedical 
information. 
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a 
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it 
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses 
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating 
needs to define its own process for translating knowl-
edge of a medical condition into an estimate of the 
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet per-
sonal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet stat-
utory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the 
impairment. We encourage each system not to make 
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability, 
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not 
intended. 
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for 
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical 
information with more than a number that represents a 
percentage of impairment. To the extent that the physi-
cian provides a comprehensive medical picture in the 
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure 
1), the user of the information will be able to determine 
how the medical information fits with all the other 
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true under-
standing of the impact of the medical impairment on 
the claimant's future employability. 
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY; 
and SMITH ADMINISTRATORS, 
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AFFIDAVIT OF 
STUART L. POELMAN 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Court of AppealB 
No. 910291CA 
Comet now the affiant, Stuart L. Poelman, being first duly sworn and deposes as 
follows: 
1. That he is an attorney practicing law in the State of Utah and specializing 
In workers' compensation cases. 
2. That in 1988 and in years prior thereto he was a member of the Industrial 
Commission's Advisory Council and actively participated in the consideration of legislative 
changes to be proposed by said Council. 
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3. That in 19S7 and 1988, management and labor factions serving on the 
Advisory Council were unable to agree on legislation regarding the Second Injury Fund. 
As a result, an ad hoc committee was formed by certain members of the Council, including 
the affiant, as well as attorneys practicing workers' compensation law and industry 
representatives. This committee proposed, drafted, sponsored and lobbied through passage 
by the legislature House Bill No. 218, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. The main problem which House Bill No. 218 addressed was maintenance of 
the fiscal integrity of the Second Injury Fund which bore the responsibility for the 
payment of certain benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Of concern was 
the fact that the Second Injury Fund was predicted by consulting actuaries to become 
insolvent unless remedial measures were taken. 
6. The intended purpose of House Bill No. 218 was to enhance the funding of 
the Second Injury Fund through an employer's premium tax increase and to reduce the 
liability of the Second Injury Fund for workers' compensation benefits. The bill eliminated 
benefits which were then being paid to injured employees for permanent partial disability 
compensation resulting from permanent partial impairment caused by preexisting 
conditions. The bill also served to reduce certain reimbursements made to employers by 
the Second Injury Fund. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the Second Injury 
Fund had been held liable for permanent partial impairment which had been caused by 
preexisting conditions. It was the intent of House Bill No. 218 to eliminate that liability. 
6. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the employer responsible for a 
particular industrial accident was shielded from liability for that portion of permanent 
partial impairment caused by preexisting conditions. It was never the intent of House Bill 
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No. 218 to transfer the liability for impairment caused by preexisting conditions from the 
Second Injury Fund to the employer. Rather, it was the intent of said legislation to 
eliminate permanent partial disability benefits payable to the injured employee to the 
extent that permanent partial disability compensation related to permanent partial 
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions. 
7. It was never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer liable for 
compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting conditions. All preexisting conditions 
related to asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial impairment were 
to go uncompensated. 
DATED this \ °\, dav of 
.Stuart L. Poelman 
Attorney at Law 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this KP*dav of May, 1992 
•"Notary Public / 
Residing at *UL,UT 
My commission expire 
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